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created a workable rule which will enable the courts of other jurisdictions to enforce the judgment without the necessity of interpreting
for itself the law of New York on this subject.
MORRIS SILVERMAN.
AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT RELATING TO COUNTERCLAIMS IN MATRIMONIAL ACTION.-In March, 1948, the legis-

lature of New York enacted a bill 1 repealing Section 1168 of the
Civil Practice Act 2 which read as follows:
COUNTERCLAIM

IN

MATRIMONIAL

ACTION.

Where an action

for divorce, separation or annulment is brought by either husband or wife, a cause of action for divorce, separation or annulment against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant may be
interposed in connection with a denial of the material allegations
of the complaint, as a counterclaim.
The repeal of this section was recommended by the Judicial Council
of the State of New York in furtherance of the Council's general
policy to foster legislation which will effect the determination of as
many controversies as possible in one action thus avoiding multiplicity of suits. 3 Section 266, Civil Practice Act, as amended in 1936,
which defines counterclaims generally, is broad enough in terms to
include the counterclaims referred to in Section 1168. However, the
courts have construed Section 1168 to be a limitation on Section 266,
as shall appear later, and as a result, counterclaims have been
denied which should have been allowed.
Since under Section 266, as it originally stood, only such counterclaims were permissible as tended to defeat or diminish plaintiff's
recovery, 4 it was necessary to enact Section 1168 which in its original form permitted counterclaims for divorce or separation in divorce
or separation actions, so that a matrimonial counterclaim of a nature
different from that in the complaint could properly be interposed. In
1936, in recognition of the general desirability of avoiding multiplicity of suits, the legislature repealed the old Section 266 and added
the present section: 5
COUNTERCLAIM DEFINED.
A counterclaim may be any cause of
action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the
plaintiffs or some of them, a person whom a plaintiff represents
or a plaintiff and another person or persons alleged to be liable.
'Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 282.
2 Laws of N. Y. 1937, c. 525.
3 N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, LEGIs. Doc. No. 13, p. 20 (1946) ; N. Y.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 2, p. 15 (1936); N. Y. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL REPORT, L-cis. Doc. No. 1, pp. 1, 44 (1935).
4 N. Y. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 501; Zawadsky v. Zawadsky, 169 Misc.
404, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
5 Laws of N. Y. 1936, c. 324.
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The purpose of this section is to permit parties to litigate between
themselves any and all claims which each may possess or acquire
against the other up to the time of trial. 6 This section is limited by
Rule 109 of the Rules of Civil Practice and Sections 267 to 271,
Civil Practice Act, none of which concern us here, and Section 262,
Civil Practice Act, 7 which was amended at the same time that Section 266 was rewritten. Section 262 is designed as a safeguard
against unjust or unwise counterclaims, giving the courts discretion
to dismiss without prejudice when they deem advisable.
These sections concerning counterclaims are of course also restricted by the common law requirements as to counterclaims generally, namely that counterclaims must state allegations sufficient to
state a cause of action,8 and that they must be affirmatively pleaded
as such or will be deemed by the courts to be defenses only.9
Prior to the amendment of Sections 266 and 1168, the courts
had refused to allow a counterclaim for separation in an action for
annulment. It was held in Sorenson v. Sorenson 10 that there was
no statutory authority for such proceeding. The court there stated
its further opinion that the actions were inconsistent since a separation assumes a marriage while an annulment assumes no legal marriage. After the amendment of Section 266 it would appear that the
statutory authority for such counterclaim would be no longer lacking
under Section 266, as Section 1168, as it then existed, provided only
for counterclaims in divorce and separation actions. In view of its
later construction, however, it is possible that the courts may have
held 'hat the legislature intended to limit all matrimonial counterclaims to those available under Section 1168. However this may be,
the question seems not to have been judicially determined. And in
1937, in order to resolve'any potential misconstruction, Section
1168 was amended so as to include counterclaims for annulment in
divorce, separation and annulment suits and vice versa."
6
Bricken Const. Corp. v. Cushman, 163 Misc. 371, 297 N. Y. Supp. 194
(Sup.7 Ct. 1937).
Laws of N. Y. 1936, c. 324. The part of Section 262 which is pertinent
here reads: A defendant may set forth in his answer as many defenses or
counterclaims, or both, as he has, whether they are such as were formerly
denominated legal or equitable; provided that the court may in its discretion,
whenever the interests of justice require, order severance of the action or
separate trials, or strike out the counterclaim without prejudice to the bringing

of another action.

Where defendant deems himself entitled to an affirmative

judgment by reason of a counterclaim interposed by him he must demand the
judgment in his answer. (Matter in italics was added in 1936.)
8 Crouch v. Crouch, 193 App. Div. 221, 183 N. Y. Supp. 657 (2d Dep't
1920); PRASHKER, NEw YORK PRAc'rlcE § 176 (1947).
9 Bates v. Rosekrans, 37 N. Y. 409 (1867); Dolgoff v. Schnitzer, 209
App. Div. 511, 205 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1st Dep't 1924).
10 122 Misc. 196, 202 N. Y. Supp. 620 (Sup. Ct.'1924), aff'd, 219 App. Div.
344, 220 N. Y. Supp. 242 (2d Dep't 1927).
11 Laws of N. Y. 1937, c. 525.
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As a result of the failure to repeal Section 1168 when Section
266 was changed and Section 262 enlarged, the courts have generally
construed Section 1168 as a limitation on Section 266. In Zawadsky
v. Zawadsky, 12 in dismissing a counterclaim for separation in an
action for a declaratory judgment that no valid marriage was contracted but that the children were nevertheless legitimate, the
Supreme Court said: "Although... Section 266 in its present form
is broad enough to permit matrimonial counterclaims in actions which
are not matrimonial in character, Section 1168, Civil Practice Act,
provides for matrimonial counterclaims only 'where an action for
divorce, separation or annulment is brought by either husband or
wife.' If matrimonial counterclaims may, as the result of the amendment of Section 266, Civil Practice Act, be permitted in any action,
regardless of its character, the provisions of Section 1168 would be
entirely superfluous and the section would be utterly meaningless.
That the failure to repeal Section 1168, Civil Practice Act, was not
inadvertent on the part of the legislature is evidenced by the fact
that a year after the amendment of Section 266, Civil Practice Act,
the legislature amended Section 1168, Civil Practice Act, so as to
permit counterclaims for annulment, the section having theretofore
authorized only counterclaims for divorce and separation." 13
This interpretation was adopted by the Appellate Division in
1946 in White v. White 14 which was an action for necessaries brought
by the wife in which the husband counterclaimed for a separation on
the ground of abandonment; and again in 1947 in Dannenbergerv.
Dannenberger,15 where the husband sought to impress a trust upon
realty acquired during coverture but held in the wife's name, the wife
counterclaiming for a separation.
On the other hand, the courts have sometimes held actions for
declaratory judgments to be matrimonial in nature, thus properly
coming under Section 1168.16 This view is not, however, in conflict
with the limitation of Section 266 held to exist because of Section
1168. The only conflict among the cases, if it can be so called, is the
determination as to whether or not the basis of the complaint is
matrimonial in nature.
These cases are to be distinguished from Saxon v. Saxon 7 an
action for necessaries in which a counterclaim for conversion of personalty was interposed by the husband. Plaintiff, on motion to dismiss the counterclaim, contended that the limitation placed on Section 266 by Section 1168 should be so broadly construed as to
12

169 Misc. 404, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1938).

13 Id. at 406, 407, 4 N. Y. S. 2d at 968.

14271 App. Div. 581, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 273 (1st Dep't 1946).
15 - Misc. -, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
16 Antrones v. Antrones, - Misc. -, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 241 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Kiebler v. Kiebler, 170 Misc. 81, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
17 178 Misc. 781, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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exclude all suits between husband and wife based on matrimonial
difficulties from the operative scope of Section 266. The court, in
refusing to accept this view, said, "If it was the intention of the
legislature to restrict counterclaims in actions between husband and
wife to those mentioned in Section 1168, language expressing such
an intention could readily have been employed and this is as much
so with respect to new Section 266." 18 This is particularly so as
remedial statutes should receive liberal construction.' 9
As a result of the limitation thus placed on Section 266 by Section 1168, certain counterclaims were denied which would have been
otherwise valid under Section 266, resulting in a necessity for bringing separate suits. It is for this reason that, effective September 1,
1948, Section 1168 will be removed from the Civil Practice Act, and
thereafter all matrimonial counterclaims will be brought directly
under Section 266 as limited by Section 262.
ANNE G. KAFK.A.

AMENDMENT TO SURROGATE'S COURT ACT RELATIVE TO CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY BY EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO
HOLDER OF CONTRACT OF SALE MADE BY A DECEDENT.-Section 227
of the Surrogate's Court Act has been recently amended in order to
facilitate the conveyance of real property of a decedent by his executor or administrator, pursuant to contracts of sale made by the decedent, without requiring court approval for such transfer, although
the executor or administrator may seek such approval at his own
option.' The section as amended now reads: 2
CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY BY EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO HOLDER OF CONTRACT OF SALE MADE BY A DECEDENT.
Where a decedent dies seized of real property after he has made
a contract for the conveyance thereof remaining unexecuted at
his death, his executor, administrator, or the successor of either,
may make a deed reciting said contract and conveying such real
property. The vendor's legal representative or the vendee, his
legal representative, distributees, devisees or assigns, may file a
petition praying for the confirmation of such conveyance, or in
the case of a vendee, his legal representative, distributees,
devisees or assigns, for a decree that the same be made and delivered, or the vendor's legal representative may pray for the like
18 Id. at 782, 36 N. Y. S. 2d at 489.

19 In re Greenberg's Estate, 261 N. Y. 474, 185 N. E. 704 (1933) ; Ginsberg

Realty Co. v. Greenstein, 157 Misc. 148, 283 N. Y. Supp. 100 (Munic. Ct.

1935), aff'd, 158 Misc. 473, 286 N. Y. Supp. 33 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
1Laws of N. Y. 1948, c. 617.
2 New matter is in italics. The section became effective September 1, 1948.

